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THE PRECARITY OF TEMPORALITY:  
HOW LAW INHIBITS IMMIGRANT WORKER 
CLAIMS
Kati L. Griffith† and Shannon M. Gleeson†† 
I. INTRODUCTION
U.S. workplace law provides a wide range of rights for the subset of 
workers who fall within the legal definitions of “employee.” It provides 
employees with the right to minimum wages for the hours they work. It 
promises employees a modicum of health and safety in the workplace. It 
promotes collective activity among employees to improve wages and 
working conditions, and it prohibits many forms of employment 
discrimination against employees.  
The primary enforcers of U.S. workplace law are the employees 
themselves, typically through employee-initiated claims against their 
employers to executive agencies and/or judicial forums.1 While some 
government-initiated enforcement initiatives do exist,2 the vast majority of 
claims still originate from individual claims by employees. Given employees’ 
central enforcement role in ensuring employer compliance, some scholars 
refer to employees as “private attorneys general,” who simultaneously 
† Associate Professor at Cornell’s ILR School 
†† Associate Professor at Cornell’s ILR School. We would like to thank Cornell’s Institute for the 
Social Sciences for funding this research and Anneliese Truame and Lori Sonken for their assistance with 
project administration. This article would not have happened without the following research assistants; 
Jessica Santos, Kennys Lawson, Darlene Dubuisson, Lynne Turner, Alicia Canas, Vivian Vázquez, and 
Jennifer O’Brien. We appreciate Caro Achar, Charlotte Alexander, Darlene Dubuisson, Andrew Elmore, 
Matthew Finkin, Judy Fudge, Leslie Gates, Vivian Vázquez, and the editors of the Comparative Labor 
Law & Policy Journal for their feedback on previous drafts. Our thinking also benefitted from 
conversations with Steven Alvarado, Matthew Hall, Jordan Matsudaira, Leticia Saucedo, Joshua Stehlik, 
Shoba Wadhia and Stephen Yale-Loehr. All errors and omissions are the responsibility of the authors.  
1. See Kati L. Griffith, Discovering “Immployment” Law: The Constitutionality of Subfederal
Immigration Regulation at Work, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 389, 431 (2011) (“An in-depth examination 
of the legislative history, language, and case law involving [FLSA and Title VII] demonstrates that 
Congress intended to . . . encourage employee-initiated complaints and to discourage employee fear of 
coming forward. The statutes’ reliance on employee-initiated complaints is manifest.”). 
2. The U.S. Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division under David Weil, for instance,
extended government-initiated enforcement initiatives. See David Weil, Strategic Enforcement in the 
Fissured Workplace, in N.Y.U. 68th ANN. CONFERENCE LAB., WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE AND WHO IS THE
EMPLOYER? (Kati L. Griffith & Sam Estreicher eds., 2015).
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enforce workplace law on behalf of themselves and the broader public 
interest.3 Others refer to the employee claims-driven rationale of U.S. 
workplace law as “bottom-up enforcement,” in contrast to top-down 
government-initiated enforcement.4
In recent decades, law and society scholars have revealed that non-
citizen workers in the United States face unique challenges to workplace law 
claimsmaking against their employers. The bulk of this literature focuses on 
the ways that the more than eight million workers who lack immigration 
authorization to be present in the United States (“unauthorized workers”)5 are 
inhibited from claimsmaking. Gleeson’s work on immigration status as “a 
precarity multiplier,” for instance, has identified the pervasive fear of 
deportation as an inhibitor to employee claimsmaking against employers.6
This body of work has highlighted the combined force of the criminal justice 
and immigration enforcement systems (the crimmigration regime) as the 
primary legal institutional space for understanding inhibitors to 
“unauthorized” employee claimsmaking. 
When scholars have considered claimsmaking inhibitors for low-wage 
“authorized” immigrant workers they have tended to spotlight temporary 
migrant worker programs, which are employment-based migration 
management systems designed to fill alleged labor shortages. Scholars 
studying the United States have concentrated extensively on low-wage 
employer-sponsored guest workers, such as H-2A agricultural workers and 
H-2B workers in seasonal industries.7 Because these workers’ immigration
authorization is explicitly tied to an employer’s sponsorship, this body of
3. Llezlie Green Coleman, Exploited at the Intersection: A Critical Race Feminist Analysis of
Undocumented Latina Workers and the Role of the Private Attorney General, 22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 
397, 400, 421 (2015) (referring to employees as “private attorney generals”); Kati L. Griffith, U.S. Migrant 
Worker Law: The Interstices of Immigration Law and Labor and Employment Law, 31 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL’Y J. 125, 160 (2009) (same); Kathleen Kim, The Trafficked Worker as Private Attorney General: A 
Model of Enforcing the Civil Rights of Undocumented Workers, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 247, 308 (2009) 
(same). 
4. See Charlotte S. Alexander & Arthi Prasad, Bottom-Up Workplace Law Enforcement: An
Empirical Analysis, 89 IND. L.J. 1069, 1070–74 (2014). 
5. See, D’Vera Cohn & Jeffrey S. Passel, Size of U.S. Unauthorized Immigrant Workforce Stable
After the Great Recession, PEW RES. CTR. 2 (Nov. 3, 2016), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/7/2016/11/02160338/LaborForce2016_FINAL_11.2.16-1.pdf.  
6. See SHANNON GLEESON, PRECARIOUS CLAIMS: THE PROMISE AND FAILURE OF WORKPLACE 
PROTECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (2016).  
7. See generally Griffith, supra note 3. See also discussion and citations in Section III.B. infra.
Besides H-2 guest workers, there has been growing attention on workplace problems in the J-1 cultural 
exchange program. See, e.g., Catherine Bowman & Jennifer Bair, From Cultural Sojourner to 
Guestworker? The Historical Transformation and Contemporary Significance of the J-1 visa Summer 
Work Travel Program, 58 LAB. HIS. 1, 16 (2017); Nicole Durkin, All Work and Not Enough Pay: 
Proposing a New Statutory and Regulatory Framework to Curb Employer Abuse of the Summer Work 
Travel Program, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1294, 1297–99 (2013); Patricia Medige & Catherine Bowman, 
U.S. Anti-Trafficking Policy and the J-1 Visa Program: The State Department’s Challenge from Within,
7 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 103, 125–26 (2012).
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work has zeroed in on the ways immigration law deters employee 
claimsmaking by delegating enhanced power to employers. The filtering of 
immigration regulation through employers and the employment arena—what 
Griffith calls immployment law8—is the central legal institutional context for 
understanding inhibitors to employee claimsmaking against employers for 
this group of authorized non-citizens in the United States. 
Scholars studying Canada—which has a far larger guest worker 
program than does the United States—have similarly examined the 
experiences of temporary migrant worker (guest worker) programs. Some 
view, for example, the Canadian Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program 
(SAWP) and Foreign Worker Program (FWP) as superior to the U.S. versions 
because of increased governmental oversight. However, programs like these 
still grant employers a problematic role in immigration regulation. Canadian 
employers do not directly sponsor workers in the same way that U.S. H-2 
employers do. Nonetheless, they exert control over the workforce through 
contract requirements9 and the evaluations they provide to government 
decision-makers about the worker’s performance.10 This research has shown 
that different employment-based temporary migrant worker programs 
impose different conditions, which result in different forms of precarity.11
This article builds on this prior work, but considers a group of 
“authorized” immigrant workers in the United States that studies of employee 
claimsmaking have overlooked. It focuses on a group of authorized 
temporary immigrants that are not part of labor market-based migration 
management systems. Specifically, the article analyzes the situation of the 
approximately one million workers who have been granted a discretionary 
and temporary reprieve from deportation for humanitarian concerns or some 
8. See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 1. 
9. See Tanya Basok & Ana López-Sala, Rights and Restrictions: Temporary Agricultural Migrants 
and Trade Unions’ Activism in Canada and Spain, 17 J. OF INT’L MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION 1271
(2015). 
10. See Leigh Binford, From Fields of Power to Fields of Sweat: The Dual Process of Constructing 
Temporary Migrant Labour in Mexico and Canada, 30 THIRD WORLD Q. 503, 514 (2009) (recounting a 
temporary worker’s feeling that workers would “get sent back to Mexico” if they engaged in claimsmaking 
against their employers). 
11. See Judy Fudge, Precarious Migrant Status and Precarious Employment: The Paradox of
International Rights for Migrant Workers, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 95 (2012) (exploring the nexus 
between precarious migrant status and precarious employment in three different Canadian temporary 
migrant worker programs). A wide body of research has also examined the challenges associated with 
temporary workers in Europe, in which non-EU workers often fall in and out of status, and are subject to 
significant immigration surveillance. See, e.g., Kitty Calavita, Braceros and Guestworkers in the United 
States and Spain: A Political and Contextual Analysis of Difference, 21 ÉNDOXA: SERIES FILOSÓFICAS
197 (2006); Stephen Castles, Guestworkers in Europe: A Resurrection?, 40 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 741 
(2006). Additional work in the Middle East and North Africa has shown the extreme precarity of guest 
workers, especially in places where entire economies rely heavily on this labor, where the mechanisms 
for worker rights are minimal, and where the mechanisms for deportation are swift and have little regard 
for civil and human rights. See NATASHA ISKANDER, CREATIVE STATE: FORTY YEARS OF MIGRATION 
AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN MOROCCO AND MEXICO (2015). 
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other public interest.12 These temporary immigrants13 do not have an existing 
path to legal permanent residency or eventual citizenship. They can apply for 
work authorization, but their legal presence in the United States is not tied to 
their employment or labor market considerations in any way. By considering 
claimsmaking inhibitors for this understudied group of temporary 
immigrants in the United States, the article builds on the work of Goldring, 
and others, who have called for intense study of the ramifications of a the 
wide ranging and diverse types of precarious migratory statuses.14
Authorized immigrant workers who are not part of a guest worker 
program warrant enhanced scholarly attention (hereafter referred to as 
“temporary immigrants” or “temporary immigrant workers”). A group of 
authors has begun to unravel the mechanisms of precarity for temporary 
immigrants in the United States.15 Menjívar likens the experience of these 
immigrants to being in a space of “suspended legality,” or a “legal limbo.”16
Heeren’s taxonomy of various non-guest worker immigration categories—
such as parole, Deferred Action and Temporary Protected Status—shows 
that, despite some differences, the temporary immigrant categories he 
highlights all share the common feature of being “temporary, tenuous, and 
tentative.” 17 Consistent with this view, Chacón has observed that temporary 
work authorization and a temporary reprieve from deportation do not “offer 
a shield” from workplace exploitation.18 There has been little theorizing, 
however, about how the “legal limbo” of temporary immigrants interacts 
12. Geoffrey Heeren, The Status of Nonstatus, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1115, 1145, 1147–49, 1155, 1158, 
1160–62 (2015) (estimating that there are close to one million individuals in some form of temporary legal 
limbo). 
13. We refer to these individuals as “immigrants” even though U.S. immigration law considers them 
to be “non-immigrants.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15). We do this because, despite this legal definition, 
“immigrants” is colloquially understood to include foreign-born non-citizen workers. See D. Carolina 
Núñez, War of the Words: Aliens, Immigrants, Citizens, and the Language of Exclusion, 2013 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 1517, 1526–41 (2013) (illustrating the widespread colloquial usage); Immigrant, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/immigrant (last visited Apr. 6, 
2017); Cohn & Passel, supra note 5 (referring to technical “non-immigrants” as immigrants). 
14. Luin Goldring, Carolina Berinstein & Judith K. Bernhard, Institutionalizing Precarious
Migratory Status in Canada, 13 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 239 (2009). 
15. See generally Leisy Abrego & Sarah M. Lakhani, Incomplete Inclusion: Legal Violence and
Immigrants in Liminal Legal Statuses, 37 L. & POL’Y 265 (2015); Jennifer Chacón, Producing Liminal 
Legality, 92 DENV. U.L. REV. 709, 710 (2015) (unpacking “the legal mechanisms that produce liminal 
legality.”). This work draws on Turner’s concept of liminality. VICTOR TURNER, THE FOREST OF 
SYMBOLS: ASPECTS OF NDEMBU RITUAL (1967). It also pulls from Coutin’s concept of liminal legality. 
SUSAN B. COUTIN, LEGALIZING MOVES: SALVADORAN IMMIGRANTS’ STRUGGLE FOR U.S. RESIDENCY 
(2000); Susan B. Coutin, Denationalization, Inclusion, and Exclusion: Negotiating the Boundaries of 
Belonging, 7 IND. J. OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 585 (2000). 
16. Cecilia Menjívar, Liminal Legality: Salvadoran and Guatemalan Immigrants’ Lives in the
United States, 111 AM. J. SOC. 999, 1003, 1008 (2006). See also Agnieszka Kubal, Conceptualizing Semi-
Legality in Migration Research, 47 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 555, 556-57 (2013) (citing a number of scholars 
and noting terms such as “in-betweens,” “liminal migrants,” “civically stratified,” and “quasi-legal.”). 
17. Heeren explains that they do not have “status” as that concept is described under federal
immigration law, but they also do not have “no status.” Heeren, supra note 12, at 1132. 
18. Chacón, supra note 15, at 718. 
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with employee claimsmaking, the motor of the workplace law enforcement 
scheme in the United States.  
In this article, we propose that temporary immigrant workers in the 
United States face unique law-induced challenges to claimsmaking when 
compared to other categories of workers with precarious immigration 
statuses,19 such as unauthorized workers and H-2 guest workers. We present 
a systematic comparison of each group, drawing on a review of the existing 
literature and a new pilot study, to examine how the challenges facing each 
set of immigrants overlap in some ways, but are unique in others. We 
conclude that particular differences in U.S. immigration law categories 
(unauthorized, H-2 guest workers, and temporary immigrant workers) may 
shape how immigrants on the ground interact with broader legal regimes, 
such as criminal, employment, and administrative law. In turn, these differing 
legal institutional contexts affect how immigrants weigh the prospect of 
coming forward with a workplace law claim against their employers.  
While the crimmigration regime is the central legal institutional context 
inhibiting claimsmaking behavior for unauthorized workers, and 
immployment regime inhibitors are dominant for H-2 guest workers, 
temporary immigrants reveal the primacy of a different legal institutional 
space. We propose that administrative (rather than enforcement and 
employment related) processes of immigration law—and the bureaucratic 
steps required to grant both temporary reprieves from deportation and work 
authorizations—is a primary legal institutional context for understanding 
law-induced inhibitors to temporary immigrant workers’ claimsmaking. We 
dub this arena the adminigration regime. In doing so, we expose the ways 
that the legal environment can generate workplace precarity that inhibits 
claimsmaking for authorized non-citizen employees, even when an 
immigrant’s employment status has no formal relationship to his or her 
immigration status.  
We do not argue that law and legal regimes represent the only inhibitors 
to claimsmaking. Moreover, we do not contend that one can fully 
differentiate these institutional spaces of crimmigration, immployment, and 
adminigration from each other.20 Instead, our goal is to establish that law’s 
19. We use “precarious immigration status” in a similar way to Goldring and Landolt. See Luin
Goldring & Patricia Landolt, Caught in the Work–Citizenship Matrix: The Lasting Effects of Precarious 
Legal Status on Work for Toronto Immigrants, 8 GLOBALIZATIONS 325, 328 (2011) (defining it as “the 
absence of key rights or entitlements usually associated with the full or nearly full status of citizenship 
and permanent residence . . . includes ‘documented’ but temporary workers . . . [and includes] gradations 
and multidimensionality of non-citizenship and ‘illegality.’”).  
20. See Marcel Paret & Shannon Gleeson, Precarity and Agency Through a Migration Lens, 20
CITIZENSHIP STUDIES 277 (2016) (discussing the interactive processes that foster precarity); Kati L. 
Griffith, Laborers or Criminals?: The Impact of Crimmigration on Labor Standards Enforcement, in THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF IMMIGRATION: CONTEXTS AND CONSEQUENCES (2014) (discussing the relationship 
between the crimmigration regime and the immployment law regime).
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imprint on non-citizen employees’ claimsmaking exists on a continuum and 
each immigration category is likely to pose its own distinctive barriers to 
employee claimsmaking.21
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. Section II will provide 
a brief overview of the process of employee claimsmaking in the U.S. 
workplace law context. It will also describe how scholars have broadly 
conceptualized inhibitors to employee claimsmaking against their employers. 
This framework informs our subsequent analysis of the ways that an 
individual’s immigration category under U.S. immigration law may 
exacerbate some of these dynamics. Section III will specify how differing 
legal institutional contexts shape claimsmaking inhibitors for unauthorized 
workers and employer-sponsored H-2 guest workers. This analysis and a 
systematic survey of the existing scholarship illustrates that a dominant focus 
on unauthorized workers and employer-sponsored H-2 guestworkers has led 
to a dominant focus on the crimmigration and immployment legal regimes.  
Section IV will consider the specific case study of workers with 
Temporary Protected Status (TPS), in hopes that it will provide insight about 
potential claimsmaking inhibitors for the broader group of temporary 
immigrants in the United States. As mentioned above, there are about one 
million non-guest worker temporary immigrants in the United States. There 
is an alphabet soup of immigration law designations that fit this category, 
including several forms of deferred action, humanitarian parole and 
Convention Against Torture beneficiaries. While there are differences among 
various types of temporary immigrant workers, they all share a temporary 
reprieve from deportation and the possibility of a temporary work 
authorization.22
Taking on the specific case of TPS is justified because it is one of the 
most populous categories. About a third of the population of temporary 
immigrants have TPS.23 By definition, TPS is a form of temporary 
humanitarian relief made available to individuals who have been present in 
the United States for a designated time period, do not have a criminal history, 
21. See generally Kara Cebulko, Documented, Undocumented and Liminally Legal: Legal Status
During the Transition to Adulthood for 1.5-Generation Brazilian Immigrants, 55 SOC. Q. 143 (2014) 
(suggesting that immigrants, too, see a hierarchy of statuses that ranges from unauthorized, to liminal 
status, to legal permanent resident/citizenship status.). 
22. The population of temporary immigrants has grown in recent years. Temporary immigrant
programs, such as the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program—whose beneficiaries 
are popularly known as the “Dreamers”—grew under President Obama’s administration. See Chacón, 
supra note 14, at 713. See also Heeren, supra note 12, at 1181 (“The embattled state of immigrant rights 
and benefits is perhaps part of the reason why nonstatus has become the default answer to the immigration 
policy debate. Nonstatus comes with minimal rights and benefits, although even those have provoked an 
outcry.”). 
23. CARLA N. ARGUETA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20844, TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS:
CURRENT IMMIGRATION POLICY AND ISSUES 4 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RS20844.pdf 
(estimating that there are 378,000).
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and are from certain countries. The administration can designate countries as 
TPS eligible if they are experiencing severe environmental problems, wars 
or other extraordinary and temporary conditions. TPS beneficiaries from El 
Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti account for 90% of the TPS population in the 
United States.24 TPS holders share many similarities with the other 
individuals who have some form of temporary reprieve from deportation and 
temporary work authorization. Although it is named Temporary Protected 
Status, TPS offers “no formal legal immigration status, much less a path to 
citizenship.”25 Once individuals receive TPS, they are eligible to apply for 
Employment Authorization Documents (EADs) to work in the United States 
for a specified period of time.26 The U.S Department of Homeland Security, 
in consultation with the U.S. Secretary of State, has the discretion to renew 
or remove a country’s TPS designation.27
Investigating the case of TPS workers has the added benefit of 
evaluating proposed changes to the H-2 guest worker program. If advocates 
succeed in gaining more visa portability for H-2 workers,28 the legal 
institutional context that H-2 workers experience would look more like the 
context that temporary immigrant workers experience under TPS. Thus, the 
more we learn about TPS workers, the more we learn about the potential 
future of low-wage guest work in the United States. 
Our theoretical framework draws on more than a dozen interviews with 
legal experts who advise temporary immigrant workers in the New York City 
(NYC) area and the authors’ pilot study of fourteen in-depth interviews with 
TPS workers in NYC during the summer of 2016.29 Before concluding, 
Section V will discuss the challenges and benefits of examining legal regimes 
 24. El Salvador has 195,000, Honduras has 57,000, and Haiti has 50,000). ARGUETA, supra note 23.
See also Robert Warren & Donald Kerwin, A Statistical and Demographic Profile of the US Temporary 
Protected Status Populations from El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti, 5 J. ON MIGRATION AND HUMAN 
SECURITY 577, 579 (2017). 
 25. Chacón, supra note 15, at 722. 
 26. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., Temporary Protected Status,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status#Countries%20Currently%20Designated 
%20for%20TPS (last updated Mar. 6, 2017). 
 27. Congress, with the Immigration Act of 1990, created Temporary Protected Status (TPS). 
ARGUETA, supra note 23, at 2–4. 
28. See, e.g., LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: REFORMING THE H-2B PROGRAM TO PROTECT 
GUESTWORKERS AND U.S. WORKERS 12 (Penn State Univ. & Nat. Guest Worker Alliance Eds. 2012); 
Cathleen Caron, Portable Justice, Global Workers, and the United States, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 549, 
549–55 (2007); Andrew J. Elmore, Egalitarianism and Exclusion: U.S. Guest Worker Programs and a 
Non-Subordination Approach to the Labor-Based Admission of Nonprofessional Foreign Nationals, 21
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 521, 528-29 (2007); Matthew Lister, Justice and Temporary Labor Migration, 29 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 95, 116–17 (2014); Michael Wishnie, Labor Law After Legalization, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1446, 
1455–56 (2008); Michelle Chen, Carnivals are No Picnic for Migrant Workers, HUFF. POST (Oct. 28, 
2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michelle-chen/carnivals-are-no-picnic-f_b_3832823.html. 
 29. Griffith and Gleeson worked with a number of New York City-based legal services providers to 
spread the word about the opportunity to voluntarily participate in a one-hour interview with one of the 
project’s Research Assistants. All information related to the identity of the interviewees is confidential.  
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as sources of precarity and, by extension, as inhibitors to employee 
claimsmaking.  
II. WORKPLACE LAW CLAIMSMAKING PROCESS
Claimsmaking in the U.S. workplace law context typically means that 
an employee, or a group of employees, brings claims against the employer(s) 
to a court, or an executive agency. Relevant workplace law agencies include 
the U.S. Department of Labor, the National Labor Relations Board, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, and their state and local 
equivalents.30 Even though there are differing enforcement schemes based on 
the legal and geographic jurisdictions,31 they are all bottom-up enforcement 
schemes that rely heavily on employee accounts. 
In this article, we isolate inhibitors to claimsmaking, which is the final 
stage of the traditional three-stage “naming, blaming and claiming” model of 
the dispute pyramid.32 In the first phase, the naming phase, an individual has 
to be able to see a situation as “injurious” under the law.33 The second and 
third phases move the aggrieved worker closer to action. During the second 
blaming phase, a worker must be able to identify another entity as at “fault,” 
rather than internalize the wrong.34 Then, in the third phase, the individual 
makes an actual claim to denounce the harm and try to remedy the injury 
against him or her.35
We do not dispute the necessity of employees’ knowledge of their rights 
and employees’ identification of the employer as the party who is at fault. 
Nonetheless, here we assess inhibitors to claimsmaking (the third stage) as 
this allows us to carefully consider the impact of legal regimes on an 
individual’s ability to convert knowledge of their workplace law rights into 
an actual claim against his/her employer. 
30. See, e.g., Shannon Gleeson, Means to An End: An Assessment of the Status-Blind Approach to
Protecting Undocumented Worker Rights, 57 SOC. PERSP. 301, 304–06 (2014); Candice S. Thomas, 
“Immployment” Law: The Determination of Remedial Measures for Undocumented Workers in the 
Workplace, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1009, 1018–24 (2015). 
31. Protections of employees derive from a wide array of federal, state and city laws, such as “living 
wage” laws that have proliferated in recent years. See, e.g., Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE 
L.J 2, 50–53 (2016); Richard C. Schragger, Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation, and the
Democratic City, 123 HARV. L. REV. 482, 584–513 (2009). 
32. William Felstiner and others first developed the basic framework of naming, blaming and
claiming to describe how problems evolve into legal claims. William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & 
Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming, 15 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 631, 636 (1980). 
33. Id. at 634–36. Alexander and Prasad differentiate substantive versus procedural legal knowledge. 
The former is key especially for the naming phase of claimsmaking, since workers must first know what 
their basic rights are under the law. The latter is necessary for determining how to vindicate those rights. 
Alexander & Prasad, supra note 4, at 1093–97. 
34. See Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, supra note 32, at 635–36. 
35. Id.
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This article considers how employees with three different precarious 
immigration statuses interface with three known inhibitors to employee 
claimsmaking: (1) how difficult an employee believes it will be to find a new 
job in the event the employee is terminated, (2) an employee’s feeling of 
powerlessness when an employment dispute arises, and (3) the lack of 
meaningful affirmative incentives to make a claim against an employer. After 
briefly describing these dynamics in this Section, the Sections below will use 
these frames to illustrate how a worker’s immigration law category 
(unauthorized worker, H-2 guest worker, and temporary immigrant worker) 
may intensify each of these three dynamics in some circumstances. 
First, employees who do not feel like they can find employment in the 
face of job loss may be inhibited from claiming against their employers. 
Despite formal legal protections against employer retaliation in the face of 
claimsmaking, retaliation protections are no guarantee against job loss or 
immigration arrests. In this vein, Hirschman’s insights about “exit,” “voice” 
and “loyalty”36 are relevant to understanding potential inhibitors to employee 
claiming against employers.37 In Hirschman’s heuristic, workers who face 
problems have three choices: exiting the employment relationship, voicing 
their concerns (claiming), or exhibiting loyalty through inaction. Thus, 
perceived restraints on exit from the employment relationship, or continued 
loyalty to an employer, can mitigate against making a claim for workplace 
law enforcement against an employer. These dynamics, of course, affect 
many employees engaged in low-wage and precarious employment. As we 
will elaborate upon below, however, we consider how unauthorized, H-2 and 
temporary immigrant workers may have different views about their job 
mobility and employer loyalty due, at least in part, to their different legal 
postures.
Second, imbalances of power between employers and employees, or 
what the New Dealers referred to as “inequality of bargaining power” 
between the parties to an employment relationship, can also mitigate against 
employee-initiated claimsmaking against an employer.38 Undoubtedly, a 
feeling of powerlessness can inhibit employee claimsmaking against an 
employer, even in cases of the most egregious of workplace law violations. 
In the analysis below, we build on Anderson’s work, which suggests that a 
 36. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). 
37. See, e.g., Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, supra note 32, at 633 n.5 (“Our perspective is influenced by 
the work of . . . economists concerned with responses to consumer dissatisfaction (e.g. Hirschman, 1970) 
. . .”). 
38. See, e.g., Alexander J.S. Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration and Inequality of Justice in Employment,
35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71, 78 (2014). 
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worker’s immigration status can enhance these power balances in unique 
ways.39
Third, scholars have identified the lack of incentives, or forceful 
disincentives, as key to understanding inhibitors to claimsmaking. Alexander 
and Prasad, for instance, identify several incentives and disincentives that 
workers consider before engaging in claiming behavior, such as fears of 
employer retaliation if they dare to do so and the likelihood of potential 
monetary gains if the worker’s claim is successful.40 Their findings suggest 
that unauthorized workers may face a disproportionate amount of employer 
retaliation as compared to their authorized counterparts, thereby reducing 
their incentives to come forward.41 In our analysis below, we consider how 
three different immigration law categories may pose unique sets of 
disincentives and perceptions about the consequences of employer 
retaliation.
III. CRIMMIGRATION AND IMMPLOYMENT REGIMES AS INHIBITORS
In this Section we apply the broad claimsmaking dynamics outlined in 
Section II to the particular circumstances of unauthorized workers and H-2 
guest workers. Through this comparison, we conclude that the crimmigration
and immployment law regimes are central to understanding the workplace 
precarity more broadly, and claiming inhibitors more specifically, of these 
two groups.  
A. Unauthorized Workers
1. Crimmigration
For unauthorized workers, a central inhibitor to claiming is the 
crimmigration regime.42 The intensified blending of criminal and 
immigration regulation communicates that unauthorized individuals could be 
39. Bridget Anderson, Migrations, Immigration Controls and the Fashioning of Precarious
Workers, 24 WORK, EMP. & SOC’Y 300 (2010). 
40. Alexander & Prasad, supra note 4, at 1089–97. 
41. Id. at 1091, 1074 (stating that unauthorized workers, women and workers with low education
levels “were less likely to make claims” and “the most likely to experience retaliation”). 
42. There are three central actors in the crimmigration enforcement and deportation apparatus.
Courts, including criminal courts and the U.S. Department of Justice’s civil immigration courts, play a 
role in setting the conditions for and activating deportations from the country. See, e.g., DANIEL 
KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH: DEPORTATION LAW AND THE NEW AMERICAN DIASPORA 169–75 (2012). The 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE) 
is tasked with detection, apprehension and deportation of unauthorized immigrants. Local police officers, 
through coordinated efforts with DHS, have also increasingly played a role in the immigration 
enforcement machinery. DORIS M. PROVINE ET AL., POLICING IMMIGRANTS: LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
ON THE FRONT LINES 117–46 (2016). 
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deported at any time for any reason. This dynamic enhances employer power 
in the workplace and can foster employee perceptions that they cannot 
challenge the employer in any way, or freely leave the current employment 
relationship.  
The existing literature’s dominant attention on the unauthorized 
workforce is undoubtedly merited. Conservative estimates suggest that there 
are at least 8 million unauthorized employees currently laboring in the United 
States. While this workforce43 represents a small slice of the overall U.S. 
labor force (an estimated 5%), in some industries, unauthorized workers 
constitute a significant percentage.44 At minimum, they are 17% of the 
agriculture industry and 13% of the construction industry.45
Moreover, the literature’s emphasis on the crimmigration regime as a 
key legal institutional context for understanding the precarity of the 
unauthorized population is also warranted. The boundary between criminal 
law and immigration law has become increasingly blurred in the last 
decade;46 so much so that Juliet Stumpf’s 2006 conceptualization of 
“crimmigration” law has gained wide usage nationally and internationally.47
There are a number of reasons for this crimmigration turn. Because of federal 
legislative changes in 1996, more and more crimes can lead to immigration 
problems and more and more immigration-related activities can result in 
criminal court prosecution.48 Moreover, state and local anti-immigrant 
legislation, as well as local policing of immigrants, increasingly have played 
a role in the immigration enforcement and deportation machinery.49
While the crimmigration regime affects all non-citizens, even legal 
permanent residents who can become deportable if convicted of certain 
misdemeanors or crimes,50 the crimmigration turn has unique relevance for 
 43. Cohn & Passel, supra note 5. 
44. See id. at 8–15.  
45. See id. at 7–8. 
 46. Julia Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. UNI.
L. REV. 367, 379–81 (2006). 
47. See e.g., Allegra M. McLeod, The U.S. Criminal-Immigration Convergence and Its Possible 
Undoing, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 105, 110, 178 (2012); Boldizsar Nagy, Hungarian Asylum Law and Policy 
in 2015-2016: Securitization instead of Loyal Cooperation, 17 GERMAN L.J. 1033, 1041, 1082 (2016). 
48. See KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE “HUDDLED MASSES” MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS 8
(2004) (arguing that “tough on crime” measures which increased in the 1990s lead to punishment for 
“criminal aliens.”); Douglas S. Massey & Karen A. Pren, Unintended Consequences of U.S. Immigration 
Policy: Explaining the Post-1965 Surge from Latin America, 38 POPULATION DEV. REV. 11, 15–6 (2012).  
49. See generally CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, CRIMMIGRATION LAW (2015); 
JOHNSON, supra note 48, at 42–45. 
 50. There are several “criminal” exclusions that would render any non-citizen deportable, including 
a broad range of “aggravated felonies.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2017); 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2017). Aggravated 
felonies range from serious crimes such as murder and drug trafficking, to comparatively less serious 
misdemeanors such as filing a false tax return, theft, or battery. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2017); 8 U.S.C. § 1227 
(2017). 
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the unauthorized population. The “punitive turn” of legal control,51 described 
by Stuart, Armenta and Osborne, heightens the looming threat of deportation 
through such things as home arrests, immigration raids, and state and local 
anti-immigrant policymaking.52 As the work of Gleeson has illustrated, the 
“looming risk of discovery and deportation” exacerbates unauthorized 
workers’ “aversion to conflict” and ability to speak up in the face of 
workplace rights violations.53 Similarly, Maira contends that the “deportation 
regime” inhibits unauthorized workers from mobilizing their workplace 
rights.54 The crimmigration regime intensifies inequality of bargaining power 
in the workplace by adding potential deportation threats to the list of 
“multifaceted mechanisms of employer retaliation.”55
The authors’ pilot study in the New York City metropolitan area 
provided some illustrations of this crimmigration dynamic. For example, 
Mackenzy, a TPS holder from Haiti, described how she felt when she was 
unauthorized: “[W]hen I didn’t yet have papers, each time I saw a police 
officer, my heart broke. This thing kept me on edge, I always knew, I always 
knew that they’ll arrest me, they’ll deport me, they’ll return me to Haiti.”56
Mackenzy also described the need to be on constant alert for those who might 
take advantage of her vulnerable situation as an unauthorized person: “[i]t is 
something that’s very sad for people who are illegal, you see . . . there are a 
lot of people, too, who profit off of us to make money, to make people fear, 
especially when it comes to deportation.” Receiving Temporary Protected 
Status brought her relief from these fears.57
2. Immployment
Prior literature identifies the interaction between immigration regulation 
and the employment arena, or immployment law, as an additional legal 
institutional context that has implications for unauthorized workers’ 
claimsmaking. The melding of immigration regulation and employment 
communicates that an employee’s U.S. workplace law claim may somehow 
51. Forrest Stuart, Amada Armenta & Melissa Osborne, Legal Control of Marginal Groups, 11 ANN.
REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 235, 237–38 (2015). 
52. Bridget Anderson, Matthew J. Gibney & Emanuela Paoletti, Citizenship, Deportation and the
Boundaries of Belonging, 15 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 547, 549–63 (2011). 
53. Shannon Gleeson, Labor Rights for All? The Role of Undocumented Immigrant Status for
Worker Claims Making, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 561, 563, 594 (2010); accord GLEESON, supra note 6, 
at 125–27. 
54. Sunaina Maira, Radical Deportation: Alien Tales from Lodi and San Francisco, in THE
DEPORTATION REGIME: SOVEREIGNTY, SPACE, AND THE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT 301 (Nicholas De 
Genova & Nathalie Peutz eds., 2010). 
55. GLEESON, supra note 6, at Table 2C. 
56. Interview by Kennys Lawson with Mackenzy Doe, Temp. Protected Status Holder, in New York, 
New York (July 14, 2016). 
57. Id.
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result in immigration consequences. While these enforcement arenas are 
technically separate, and both the U.S. Department of Labor and U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement unit follow distinct organizational 
missions, the exploitation of labor claims to advance deportation cases is 
unfortunately not without precedent. 
For unauthorized workers, private employers may appear like an arm of 
the immigration enforcement state. Unauthorized employees may fear 
employers as immigration enforcers, or may simply not want to rock the boat 
and risk losing their jobs. An employee’s perception that employers are 
immigration enforcers restrains employee voice in the workplace and 
enhances already significant imbalances in power between employers and 
employees—two dynamics that exacerbate inhibitions to claimsmaking. 
Indeed, Sexsmith’s recent study of unauthorized immigrant dairy workers in 
upstate New York describes the “constrained loyalty to paternalistic farmers” 
that can mitigate against claimsmaking by unauthorized workers.58
The perception that employers are immigration enforcers is not 
completely unfounded. U.S. employers do have some power over 
immigration enforcement as part of a general trend toward the devolution and 
privatization of immigration control. Starting in 1986,59 the United States 
placed employer-employee relations at the heart of immigration enforcement. 
It gave employers the role of verifying the work authorization status of each 
of its employees and created sanctions for employers who knowingly hire 
unauthorized immigrant workers.60 While employers are currently under no 
legal requirement to report unauthorized immigrants to immigration 
authorities, their role in the employee verification process obscures the 
waters as it fosters the perception that employers are part of the immigration 
enforcement regime.  
The immployment regime may also inhibit claimsmaking for 
unauthorized workers because of a perception that workplace law protections 
are less robust for unauthorized employees. Indeed, unauthorized employees 
do not have the right to get their jobs back if they are illegally fired for 
making a workplace law complaint. This is the case because U.S. 
immigration law prevents an employer from knowingly employing an 
unauthorized employee.  
 58. Kathleen Sexsmith, Exit, Voice, Constrained Loyalty, and Entrapment:Migrant Farmworkers 
and the Expression of Discontent on New York Dairy Farms, 20 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 311, 311 (2016) 
(italics in original). 
 59. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (1986). 
 60. Kati L. Griffith, Immigration Advocacy As Labor Advocacy, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. LAW 
73, 83–84 (2012); Sarah Horton, From “Deportability” to Denounce-ability:” New Forms of Labor 
Subordination in an Era of Governing Immigration Through Crime, 39 POL. AND LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY 
REV. 312 (2016). 
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Moreover, unauthorized employees are also disincentivized from 
claiming because there is little clarity about whether they have the same 
rights to monetary remedies in successful workplace law cases, as compared 
to their authorized counterparts. A 2002 U.S. Supreme Court decision, 
Hoffman Plastic v. NLRB, concluded that while unauthorized employees had 
the labor law “right” to engage in collective activity under the National Labor 
Relations Act, they did not have access to the “remedy” of backpay to 
compensate them for the wages they lost because they were illegally fired.61
Hoffman is “a powerful legal symbol” that “sends a message of exclusion to 
undocumented workers,” even though they have workplace law rights on the 
books.62 Why claim if retaliation is possible and the remedy for the 
workplace law violation is unclear?63 Thus, even unauthorized employees 
who are aware of their rights under workplace law and know that the 
employer is the party to blame for the particular injustice, may be inhibited 
from claimsmaking because they lack the proper incentives. 
The uncertain relationship between immigration enforcement and the 
employment sphere creates an additional disincentive for this group. 
Unauthorized employees may fear that all branches of government, even 
workplace law agencies who enforce the law on behalf of employees, engage 
in immigration enforcement. Indeed, U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) staff 
members recently lamented that some unauthorized employees were so 
scared of immigration enforcement that they ran away from DOL staff and 
“declin[ed] to accept back wages owed to them” under workplace law.64
Therefore, while workplace law agencies have made efforts to clarify the 
separation between workplace law and immigration law enforcement in the 
United States,65 some unauthorized immigrants are still fearful. 
61. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 144–52 (2002). 
62. Ruben J. Garcia, Ten Years after Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. vs. NLRB: The Power of a
Labor Law Symbol, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 659, 662 (2012); Charlotte S. Alexander, Explaining 
Peripheral Labor: A Poultry Industry Case Study, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 353, 384–85, (2012) 
(describing how Hoffman Plastics creates precarity for poultry workers as it creates a “barrier” for poultry 
workers attempting to challenge their precarious situations and attain protection and stability). 
63. See Kati L. Griffith, When Federal Immigration Exclusion Meets Subfederal Workplace
Inclusion: A Forensic Approach to Legislative History, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 881, 882 (2014) 
(“In the last decade there has been widespread and inconsistent adjudication of this issue in courts across 
the country”). 
64. Sam Levin, Immigration Crackdown Enables Worker Exploitation, Labor Department Staff Say,
THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/30/undocumented-
workers-deportation-fears-trump-administration-department-labor. 
65. See Gleeson, supra note 30, at 301–20; Stephen Lee, Monitoring Immigration Enforcement, 53
ARIZ. L. REV. 1089, 1130–36 (2011); Kati L. Griffith, ICE Was Not Meant to be Cold: The Case for Civil 
Rights Monitoring of Immigration Enforcement at the Workplace, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1137 (2011). 
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B. H-2 Guest Workers
1. Immployment
While the crimmigration regime is the dominant institutional space for 
“(re)creating the regime of deportability” for unauthorized immigrants, 
employers’ role in immigration authorization, the immployment legal regime, 
is the dominant factor shaping low-wage H-2 guest worker precarity in the 
United States.66
Even though the population of H-2 guest workers is relatively small, as 
compared to unauthorized and temporary immigrant workers, scholars have 
studied this group because they represent the entire population of low-wage 
guest workers in the United States. The H-2 program is the only program to 
allow “no skills required” foreign workers to the United States to fill labor 
shortages temporarily. In 2014, the U.S. government issued 240,620 H-2A 
(Seasonal Agricultural Workers) and 105,416 H-2B (Seasonal Non-
Agricultural Workers) visas.67 The numbers of H-2 workers are higher in 
practice because these numbers of newly granted visas do not include visa 
reissuances for existing H-2 workers.68 Moreover, guest worker programs 
have received intense international scholarly attention because they represent 
a growing model worldwide.69
The particular legal structure of the H-2 program in the United States 
creates conditions that may intensify an H-2 worker’s feelings of “loyalty” to 
an employer in some cases, and fear of an employer’s power in others.70 Both 
of these sentiments are not conducive to claimsmaking, which requires an 
employee to be willing to make a claim against the employer. There are three 
main immployment mechanisms that work against claimsmaking for H-2 
workers: employer sponsorship, employers’ central role in enforcing 
immigration law, and debt servitude to an employer. 
Employer sponsorship, and thus a lack of visa portability, gives 
employers enormous power over H-2 workers. Thus, it could be a key factor 
in driving claiming behavior for H-2 workers. For both the H-2A and H-2B 
66.  Tonya Basok, Daniele Belanger & Eloy Rivas, Reproducing Deportability: Migrant
Agricultural Workers in South-western Ontario, 40 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 1394, 1397 (2014). 
67. John Teke & Waleed Navarro, Nonimmigrant Admissions to the United States: 2015, DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC. 4 (Dec. 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Nonimmigrant_ 
Admissions_2015.pdf. 
68. Id. at 2.
69. See, e.g., Christina Gabriel, Managed Migration and the Temporary Labour Fix, in LIBERATING
TEMPORARINESS? 99–125 (Leah F. Vosko, Valerie Preston & Robert Latham eds. 2014). 
70. Elmore, supra note 28, at 536 (“The centrality of the employer in guest worker programs . . .
[heightens] the coercive power an employer has over a nonprofessional worker not to complain about or 
leave an exploitative work relationship”); Jennifer Lee, Private Civil Remedies: A Viable Tool for Guest 
Worker Empowerment, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 31, 44 (2012) (stating that the “underlying structural flaw of 
guest worker programs remains intact—having workers tied to a single employer by a temporary visa”).  
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programs, a foreign guest worker can only gain entry if sponsored by a U.S.-
based employer. Once in the United States, the H-2 guest worker’s legal 
status is tied to the sponsoring employer and cannot be transferred to a 
separate employer without permission from the original sponsoring 
employer, the new sponsoring employer, and the U.S. government.71 If the 
relationship between the employer and H-2 worker terminates, the H-2 
worker must return to her country of origin within days.72
This relationship of adhesion is exacerbated further by the fact that an 
H-2 employer is under no obligation to renew a worker’s contract and can
blacklist an entire sending community by refusing to recruit in that region
moving forward.73 For these reasons, the extant literature on the H-2 guest
worker programs in the United States contain a heavy critique of the lack of
visa portability to new employers as a driving factor of worker exploitation.74
Another immployment-related legal mechanism that works against 
employee claimsmaking is that the H-2 program requires employers to play 
a direct role in immigration enforcement. Specifically, the H-2 immigration 
regulations dictate that an employer must notify the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and the DOL within two days if the employment 
relationship terminates before the scheduled end date.75 The employer’s role 
in initiating the deportation machinery is unique in this context. As discussed 
in the prior section, employers of unauthorized workers do not have any 
direct reporting requirements to DHS. If H-2 workers terminate the 
employment relationship before they are half way through their contract 
terms, they not only risk deportation, they also lose reimbursement for their 
initial transportation fees and the promise that they will receive at least three-
fourths of the originally contracted wages.76
Additionally, debt servitude to employers, which is built into the legal 
structure of the H-2 program, exacerbates the power imbalance between 
71. Alex Nowrasteh, How to Make Guest Worker Visas Work, CATO INST. 5–12 (Jan. 31, 2013),
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa719_1.pdf. 
72. Similar challenges exist for other categories of guest workers, including “high-skilled” H1-B
workers, and certain foreign students, but we do not address those categories here. See Maria Linda 
Ontiveros, H-1B Visas, Outsourcing and Body Shops: A Continuum of Exploitation for High Tech Workers 
(Univ. San Francisco Law Research Paper No. 2016-21, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2827789. 
73. Patricia Medige, Perspectives on the Bush Administration’s New Immigrant Guestworker
Proposal: Immigrant Labor Issues, 32 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 735, 738 (2004). 
74. See, e.g., Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 503, 558 (2007); 
Michael Holley, Disadvantated by Design: How the Law Inhibits Agricultural Guest Workers from 
Enforcing Their Rights, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 575, 595 (2001); Emily B. White, How We Treat 
Our Guests: Mobilizing Employment Discrimination Protections in a Guest Worker Program, 28 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 269, 271 (2007).  
75. 20 C.F.R. §655.20(y); 20 C.F.R. 655.122(n). 
76. 20 C.F.R. § 655.20; 20 C.F.R. § 655.1304. 
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employers and employees,77 thereby inhibiting claimsmaking.78 Employers 
often pay an H-2 guest worker’s transportation and recruitment fees and then 
deduct these amounts from the H-2 worker’s pay.79 This sometimes means 
that the H-2 worker is not receiving any payment, or very minimal payment, 
until the debt is paid off.80 Some critics of the program characterize the 
relationship between employers and their H-2 employees as “modern-day 
servitude.”81 Others have argued that it rises to the level of involuntary 
servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.82 While debt is also a problem for unauthorized workers who 
often rely on a sophisticated industry of clandestine transport and false 
documents, debt servitude is built into the legal structure of H-2 guest work.83
Lee and others have highlighted how the H-2 program stokes a “climate 
of fear [that] can be created by the employers’ implicit – and sometimes even 
explicit – threats to call DHS, the existence of a blacklist, or even the mere 
fact that the employer holds the ‘deportation card.’”84 Fear alone, however, 
is not the only inhibitor to claiming for low-wage H-2 guest workers in the 
United States. Whereas the threat of deportability is a salient factor for 
unauthorized workers, employers are the over-riding source of power for 
guest workers who are tied to them. Therefore, H-2 workers have much to 
lose by engaging in claimsmaking against their employers, who are 
ultimately the linchpins to both their continuing work opportunity and legal 
status in the United States. 
To be sure, guest workers must navigate tricky terrain to maintain their 
desirability in order to, at best, be retained and, at worst, not blacklisted for 
the next season. As a result, they may avoid claimsmaking in order to avoid 
77. Kati L. Griffith, Globalizing U.S. Employment Law Through Foreign Law Influence: Mexico’s
Foreign Employer Provision and Recruited Mexican Workers, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 383, 387–90 
(2008); Bruce Ashby, Note, Indentured Guests—How the H-2A and H-2B Temporary Guest Worker 
Programs Create the Conditions for Indentured Servitude and Why Upfront Reimbursement for Guest 
Workers’ Transportation, Visa, and Recruitment Costs is the Solution, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 893, 909–15
(2008). 
78. Michael Holley, Disadvantated by Design: How the Law Inhibits Agricultural Guest Workers
from Enforcing Their Rights, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 575, 596 (2001); Jennifer Lee, Private Civil 
Remedies: A Viable Tool for Guest Worker Empowerment, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 31, 43 (2012). 
79. S. POVERTY LAW CTR., CLOSE TO SLAVERY: GUESTWORKER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES
2 (2007). 
80. See, e.g., Recinos-Recinos v. Express Forestry, Inc., No. 05-1355, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56178, 
at *2–*6, *18–*24 (E.D. La. Aug. 11, 2006). 
81. Lisa Guerra, Modern-Day Servitude: A Look at the H-2A Program’s Purposes, Regulations and 
Realities, 29 VT. L. REV. 185, 214 (2004). 
82. Maria L. Ontiveros, Noncitizen Immigrant Labor and the Thirteenth Amendment: Challenging
Guest Worker Programs, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 923, 928 (2007). 
83. THE MIGRATION INDUSTRY AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
(Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen & Ninna Nyberg Sorensen eds., 2013).  
84. Lee, supra note 70, at 43. For more on blacklisting and guest worker fear, see LANCE COMPA,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS’ FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS 41–43, 221–23 (Cynthia Brown ed. 2000). 
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employer retaliation and also compete with a vast pool of workers who court 
a complex system of formal and informal brokers. With their fieldwork, 
Basok and colleagues similarly make this observation about guest workers in 
the Canadian context. They refer to employers as central to furthering “the 
threat of deportation as a technology of discipline” for temporary guest 
workers in Canada.85
IV. ADMINIGRATION REGIME AS INHIBITOR: THE CASE OF TPS WORKERS
In this Section we examine the case of workers with Temporary
Protected Status (TPS). As previewed in the Introduction, TPS provides 
temporary protection from deportation and temporary work authorization for 
individuals from designated countries that are experiencing severe 
environmental problems, wars, or other “extraordinary and temporary 
conditions.”86 Habitual residents from such TPS designated countries who 
meet certain physical presence requirements in the United States and do not 
have a criminal history, are eligible for this type of temporary relief.  
Whereas the threat of everyday deportability is a dominant reality for 
unauthorized immigrants, and the employer relationship is central for H-2 
guest workers, the administrative immigration process carries unique 
claimsmaking inhibitors for TPS holders. Thus, as we will elaborate upon 
below, the case of TPS workers illuminates the prominence of a previously 
overlooked precarious legal institutional space: the administrative 
immigration (adminigration) regime in the United States. Moreover, analysis 
of the TPS case reveals that the adminigration regime is important on its own, 
but also in relationship to the crimmigration and immployment regimes 
discussed above. 
A. Administrative Immigration Processes
The priorities of immigration agency administrators, not employers or 
law enforcement agents, determine whether TPS holders will remain in the 
United States and whether they will gain work authorization. As a result, the 
adminigration regime is key to understanding the unique form of temporality 
and precarity for TPS holders.  
The structure of the TPS program demonstrates the prominence of the 
federal executive branch’s immigration agency prerogatives. The Secretary 
85. Basok, Belanger & Rivas, supra note 66. Migrants also co-construct this by self-disciplining and 
disciplining others. For more on the idea of self-disciplining see Valeria Ottonelli & Tiziana Torresi, 
Inclusivist Egalitarian Liberalism and Temporary Migration: A Dilemma 20 J. POL. PHIL. 202, 209–14 
(2012) (stating that temporary immigrants accept intolerable conditions in exchange for resources they 
can eventually bring to their origin countries). 
86. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a; Chacón, supra note 16, at 722 (2015). 
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of the DHS is in charge of designating and renewing a country’s eligibility 
for TPS. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services agency (USCIS), 
which is the administrative side of DHS, processes applications for TPS and 
work authorization, as well as renewals of such grants.87 Thus, immigration 
agency administrators, not employers, are central to the work authorization 
process for TPS workers. 
Administrative immigration processes foster a feeling of 
“temporariness” in the TPS community, and may deepen a TPS worker’s 
sense of powerlessness when faced with a workplace law abuse. Individuals 
undoubtedly weigh these dynamics as they consider engaging in the lengthy, 
and often ambiguous, adversarial process of making a claim against their 
employers. While the length of time guest workers have in the United States 
is written into their work contracts, for TPS workers, the length of their 
temporary reprieve may vary from country to country. And, as has happened 
recently for Haitian immigrants, a TPS designation can be shortened without 
notice. While the temporary nature of unauthorized life is similar in that it 
has no definite end, the clearly defined temporal bounds of TPS life have a 
sense of certain eventual end.  
Given this legal institutional “adminigration” context, TPS workers are 
uniquely subject to a sometimes fickle presidential administration, deepening 
a feeling of no permanent future in the U.S.88 With no clear future in the 
United States, some TPS workers may choose to endure exploitative 
conditions—and hence avoid engaging in claimsmaking. Karl, for instance, 
described work stocking shelves as an inevitable “hell,” adding that “[t]here’s 
no respect; there’s not a lot of money.”89 While the low-wage market is 
limiting for all groups of marginalized workers, TPS poses a particular 
constraint in that it provides no future pathway to permanent residence, 
further complicating any opportunity for occupational mobility. Therefore, 
Karl continued working there in part because he perceived that there were no 
other options. Many of these workers seek short-term gains in order to return 
to their country of origin eventually, even if this is not the preferred route and 
for some could mean violence or death.  
Other administrative processes—in particular TPS’ frequent renewal 
deadlines—stoke anxiety and fear in this population, which mitigate against 
claimsmaking. TPS workers face the challenge of a finite time period of 
reprieve from deportation (ranging from six to eighteen months depending 
87. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., Humanitarian, https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian
(last visited Feb. 13, 2017); U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., What We Do,
https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/what-we-do (last updated Jul. 14, 2015). 
88. Gleeson, supra note 53, at 589–92. 
89. Interview by Kennys Lawson with Karl Doe, Temp. Protected Status Holder, in New York, New 
York (August 8, 2016). 
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on the country).90 With these short grants, they must regularly reapply, and 
often pay hefty fees to do so.91 The uncertainty about how long this 
“administrative grace” will last, Chacón argues, fosters instability in the lives 
of TPS workers and other “liminal legal subjects.”92 They, in essence, work 
and live “[l]ife with an expiration date.”93 This complicates the process of 
claimsmaking, which requires a willingness to participate in public and 
adversarial agency and/or judicial forums.  
Further stoking anxiety for this population are the often long-delayed 
administrative decisions about whether to renew a country’s TPS designation 
until the last minute. TPS recipients must wait until close to the expiration 
deadline that the administrative agency set for their country to find out 
whether the agency will renew their TPS designation.94 Menjívar’s path 
breaking work on Salvadoran and Guatemalan workers confirms that the 
TPS deadlines create “enormous anxiety” and “accentuate[] these 
immigrants’ precarious situation” in their lives and work. Abrego and 
Lakhani’s study of TPS workers also points to renewals as a central source 
of precarity.95 Along similar lines, Hallett highlights how the uncertainty of 
the renewal process means that TPS workers work within the unstable 
context of the “always imminent termination of their work permits.”96
The uncertainty about the termination of TPS altogether, even when the 
administrative bureaucracy is proceeding as planned, can cause significant 
anxiety in the face of immense pressure to provide for one’s family. Martha, 
for example, reported that she received her initial paperwork to renew her 
TPS and was eagerly awaiting fingerprints at the time of our interview. When 
asked if she felt positive about her case moving forward, she worriedly 
explained that concern about a positive outcome weighed heavily on her. “I 
am praying for it. That the Lord give me that piece of paper and I keep 
90. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a (2016); Madeline Messic & Claire Bergeron, Temporary Protected Status in
the United States: A Grant of Humanitarian Relief that Is Less than Permanent, MIGRATION POLICY INST.
(Jul. 2, 2014), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/temporary-protected-status-united-states-grant-
humanitarian-relief-less-permanent. 
91. TPS holders who are reapplying for TPS designation must pay an $85 biometric services fee (if
over age 14) and a $410 fee for Form I-765 if he or she wants continued employment authorization. U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., I-821, Application for Temporary Protected Status,
https://www.uscis.gov/i-821 (last updated Dec. 22, 2016); U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., Our
Fees, https://www.uscis.gov/forms/our-fees (last updated Jan. 5, 2017); U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGRATION SERV., Temporary Protected Status, https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-
protected-status#Countries%20Currently%20Designated%20for%20TPS (last updated Mar. 6, 2017). 
92. Chacón, supra note 15, at 716. 
93. Miranda Cady Hallett, Temporary Protection, Enduring Contradiction: The Contested and
Contradictory Meanings of Temporary Immigration Status, 39 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 621, 635–38 (2014). 
94. Chacón, supra note 15, at 722–23 (stating that TPS recipients need “to wait until very near the
expiration date of their temporary protections to determine whether the Executive Branch plans to extend 
that date.”). 
95. See Leisy Abrego & Sarah M. Lakhani, Incomplete Inclusion: Legal Violence and Immigrants
in Liminal Legal Statuses, 37 L. & POL’Y 265, 279 (2015). 
96. Hallett, supra note 93, at 630. 
39-1GRIFFITHGLEESONR.DOCX 1/23/2018 7:35 AM
2017] THE PRECARITY OF TEMPORALITY 131 
working, working because my entire family counts on me. My kids count on 
me. My mother . . . counts on me.”97
A legal advocate who works with TPS beneficiaries described the time 
period before renewal dates as one that stokes “panic about whether TPS will 
be extended.”98 Gabriel, a TPS holder who was relatively content with his 
working conditions during the summer of 2016, expressed concern about the 
future of TPS after the November 2016 U.S. Presidential elections. He 
queried, “I would like to know will they continue to renew TPS for Haitians, 
no matter who the President is, whether Republican or Democrat?”99
Because it is short-term and subject to renewal by the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, TPS is subject to often highly volatile national politics 
and the ability of civil society to effectively lobby for renewal.100 Indeed, 
recent reports suggest that the President Trump’s DHS may not renew a 
number of countries’ TPS designations, a threat made all the more real by the 
recent rescission of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program. 
Such an act would render many of these individuals deportable. Currently 
Haiti’s TPS designation is renewed for only six months, and the future of El 
Salvador and Honduras TPS holders remains unclear.  
While deportation is an acute fear for unauthorized workers, TPS 
workers face the fear of not being renewed and thus falling into unauthorized 
status, all while being fully identified to the federal government and, thus, 
more easily deportable. Indeed, some reports suggest that the Trump 
administration might use TPS records to more efficiently identify and deport 
former TPS holders after it terminates the program.101
In the subsection below, we specifically examine how these 
adminigration processes interact with the crimmigration regime in ways that 
intensify precarity for this population. 
 97. Interview by Jessica Santos with Martha Doe, Temp. Protected Status Holder, in New York, 
New York (June 20, 2016). 
98. Jody Mashek Explains Temporary Protected Status, AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM. (Aug. 6, 2010) 
https://www.afsc.org/story/jody-mashek-explains-temporary-protected-status (“And of course this 
process has the potential to create fear in people. They may be grateful to have the chance to be able to 
work in this country legally, but at the same time, there’s always that panic about whether TPS will be 
extended.”). 
 99. Interview by Kennys Lawson with Gabriel Doe, Temp. Protected Status Holder, in New York, 
New York (July 7, 2016). 
 100. Chacón, supra note 15, at 711; Heeren, supra note 12, at 1175 (“Every year or two, the 
individuals with DED and its statutory cousin, TPS, wait anxiously to learn whether their status will be 
extended for another period. The existence of their status is year-to-year—dependent on political 
whims.”). 
101. See Gutiérrez Warns Those with DACA or TPS to Prepare For the Worst (July 12, 2017), 
available at https://gutierrez.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/guti-rrez-warns-those-daca-or-tps-
prepare-worst. 
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B. Crimmigration
Federal administrative immigration processes hold the key to 
designating TPS for an individual, but these dynamics should be considered 
in relationship to the crimmigration regime discussed in Section III. If a TPS 
holder loses TPS, the crimmigration regime becomes an inevitability. A key 
aspect of the liminality of TPS holders’ existence is that they often fall in and 
out of status as they await extension and renewal, subjecting them to 
deportability and job loss.102 Therefore, TPS workers’ experience with the 
immigration regulatory regime can also foster a fear of deportation, even if 
they are not presently deportable.103 This may lead to workers self-regulating 
to avoid certain risks that they perceive as possibly leading to deportation. In 
turn, these workers may be dissuaded against rocking the boat by making a 
workplace law claim against their employers.  
A Haitian TPS holder we interviewed during the summer of 2016, 
Magalie, communicated her feeling, in anticipation of a new Presidential 
administration, that she might lose her status. Her approach was to work with 
the lawyer and then just “let God do whatever it’s going to do.”104 Many 
workers with TPS, like Magalie, have previous unauthorized experience in 
the United States and, thus, know what it feels like to be central targets of the 
crimmigration regime.105 Given a political environment where anti-
immigrant sentiment abounds (even in a diverse city like New York) and the 
expanding and multilayered crimmigration enforcement context, TPS 
workers may experience heightened concerns around deportation.106
Another inhibitor to claimsmaking for TPS workers is heightened 
anxiety and deportation fears because they are subject to government 
monitoring. If a TPS worker misses a TPS renewal deadline, she becomes 
unauthorized.107 The government knows a lot more about a TPS worker who 
falls out of the TPS designation than it knows about an unauthorized 
immigrant worker who entered without inspection and has never connected 
102. See, e.g., Menjívar, supra note 16, at 1008 (stating “a situation of ‘liminal legality’ is neither 
unidirectional nor a linear process, or even a phase from undocumented to documented status, for those 
who find themselves in it can return to an undocumented status when their temporary statuses end. When 
Central Americans are granted temporary legality, they are conferred the right to work and reside in the 
United States without access to social services. In some cases, they are later given the opportunity to renew 
their permits. However, when the renewed permits expire, these immigrants slip back into the realm of 
nonlegality.”). 
 103. Abrego & Lakhani, supra note 95, at 267. 
 104.  Interview by Jessica Santos with Magalie Doe, Temp. Protected Status Holder, in New York, 
New York (June 21, 2016). 
105. Id. 
106. See Abrego & Lakhani, supra note 95, at 276. 
107. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., Temporary Protected Status,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status#Countries%20Currently%20Designated 
%20for%20TPS (last updated Mar. 6, 2017). 
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to the immigration law enforcement scheme. The government has former 
TPS holders’ fingerprints in the system and knows their names, addresses, 
and other identifying personal information.108 Some TPS holders who 
become unauthorized may be in an even more precarious situation than H-2 
workers who become unauthorized. TPS holders are more likely to have 
children with them, as compared to H-2 workers,109 and thus may have more 
difficulty distancing themselves from the address and identifying information 
they have on file with the government.  
One of our interviewees, Mackenzy, talked about fears regarding 
governmental surveillance. Mackenzy, a TPS holder at the time of our 
interview, noted that she was originally hesitant to apply for TPS because 
many others in her Haitian community saw it as a mechanism for 
governmental monitoring and surveillance. She said, “people spread fear, 
arguing that the [TPS] papers were so that [the U.S. government] can identify 
Haitians that are living in the country in order to deport them. And this is why 
there were some people who did not do it.”110 However, the fears that 
Mackenzy reported are likely warranted. Heeren’s work goes so far as to say 
that TPS and other forms of temporary relief are “essentially a registration 
program” for the government that allows for surveillance over this 
population.111
Furthermore, because of widespread confusion about the meaning of 
liminal statuses, such as TPS, TPS holders are sometimes perceived as 
unauthorized by employers. Menjívar and Abrego,112 and later, Abrego and 
Lakhani, develop the concept of “legal violence.” According to these authors, 
legal violence blocks these immigrants’ mobility, causes instability, and 
fosters fear of deportation. Abrego and Lakhani argue that “widespread 
misinformation” among employers and the public more broadly about these 
liminal statuses, and the false perception that TPS workers are unauthorized, 
“may cause immigrants harm.”113
108. See Abrego & Lakhani, supra note 95, at 279. 
109. Compare Cecilia Menjívar, Temporary Protected Status in the United States: The Experiences 
of Honduran and Salvadoran Immigrants, CTR. FOR MIGRATION RESEARCH (May 2017), available at
http://ipsr.ku.edu/migration/pdf/TPS_Report.pdf (referring to sixty-one percent of TPS respondents living 
with children in the U.S.) with Jill H. Wilson, Immigration Facts: Temporary Foreign Workers,
BROOKINGS INST., (June 18, 2013), available at https://www.brookings.edu/research/immigration-facts-
temporary-foreign-workers/ (referring to twenty-four percent of H-2 workers with families in the U.S.).
 110. Interview by Kennys Lawson with Mackenzy Doe, Temp. Protected Status Holder, in New York, 
New York (July 14, 2016). 
 111. Heeren, supra note 12, at 1132. 
 112. Cecilia Menjívar & Leisy J. Abrego, Legal Violence: Immigration Law and the Lives of Central 
American Immigrants, 117 AM. J. SOC. 1380 (2012). 
 113. Abrego & Lakhani, supra note 95, at 267. 
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C. Immployment
The adminigration processes described above also interact with the 
immployment legal regime in ways that heighten inequality of power between 
employers and TPS employees and exacerbate the propensity for TPS 
workers to feel heightened loyalty to their employers. The nature of TPS 
disciplines recipients’ work lives114 by fostering a feeling that exiting 
existing employment is difficult and may lead to unemployment. One of our 
interviewees, Karl, described the feeling of job scarcity for low-wage TPS 
holders in the following way: “I got my paper. I took the first job, I don’t 
care, whatever the job [] is. The first job, I will take it.”115 In contrast, recent 
studies of high-skilled workers who transitioned from unauthorized to 
temporary status through the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
(DACA) program suggest that the change, at least temporarily, improved job 
prospects and working conditions.116
TPS workers may be uniquely disadvantaged in the labor market, 
heightening their sense of loyalty, for a number of reasons. Employers may 
have reasons to prefer authorized employees who do not have TPS, over TPS 
holders. Under U.S. immigration law, employers are allowed to exercise 
these preferences. An employer can legally prefer to hire a legal permanent 
resident or U.S. citizen, over a TPS recipient.117
Moreover, an employer may have law-induced reasons not to hire a TPS 
holder. The uncertain details of the TPS renewal process can create confusion 
and understandable fears of potential liability among employers and human 
resources professionals. Under immigration law, employers are required to 
verify the work authorization of their employees. However, because the U.S. 
government often announces renewals of a country’s TPS designation close 
to the termination deadline, a TPS worker may have an expired work 
authorization card (EAD), even though she is still authorized to work. This 
means that an employer, confronted with an expiration date on an EAD, is 
legally obligated to re-verify the TPS worker’s work authorization. Some 
employers, or human resources professionals, just do not know the proper 
 114. Hallett, supra note 94, at 622 (referring to TPS as disciplining recipients’ work lives). 
 115. Interview by Kennys Lawson with Karl Doe, Temp. Protected Status Holder, in New York, New 
York (Aug. 8, 2016). 
 116. Center for American Progress, New Study of DACA Shows Positive Economic and Educational 
Outcomes, (October 2016), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2016 
/10/18/146290/new-study-of-daca-beneficiaries-shows-positive-economic-and-educational-outcomes. 
 117. Unlike Legal permanent residents, citizens and other specified groups TPS recipients are not 
“protected individuals” with respect to 8 USC 1324b(a)(1)(B) (prohibiting employer discrimination on 
the basis of citizenship status in recruiting, hiring or referring for a fee). 
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procedures for these situations and insist on an “unexpired card,” which is 
often simply not available to the worker.118
The Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair 
Employment Practices (OSC),119 regularly confronts this kind of employer 
confusion. One of the “Frequently Asked Questions” for OSC is what the 
TPS worker should show to be able to continue to work in the face of a TPS 
renewal but an expired EAD.120 OSC directs TPS workers in this situation to 
provide the employer with the expired employment authorization card and a 
copy of the (dense and complicated) Federal Register notice indicating an 
automatic continuation for individuals from the designated country.121
A review of OSC’s publically available reporting on its phone intakes 
suggests, however, that it is not uncommon for employers to mistakenly 
suspend workers who have expired Employment Authorization Documents 
but are nationals of countries with TPS extensions.122 Even when a TPS 
worker follows the OSC FAQ advice and provides the employer with the 
proper Federal Register notice, employers sometimes are unaware that this 
is sufficient to comply with immigration law’s employee verification 
requirements.123 Moreover, the phone intakes suggest that the TPS renewal 
process’ interface with the electronic employee verification (E-Verify) 
system may be confusing for some employers.124 Ultimately, without a 
contract, these workers often have few other recourses once terminated. 
Abrego and Lakhani’s interviews with TPS workers also confirmed the 
common perception that employers are often reluctant to “deal with the 
paperwork” related to Employment Authorization Documents.125 Even more 
striking is Hallett’s finding that employers may sometimes prefer 
unauthorized workers (who have work authorization papers that appear valid 
on their face and that do not have termination dates) over TPS workers who 
have EADs with termination dates.126 In our own work, we encountered 
similar perceptions such as Heloise, a TPS holder who discussed the 
difficulty of looking for work. She described confronting employers who 
seemed hesitant to hire her because they simply did not understand what TPS 
 118. DEP’T JUSTICE, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), https://www.justice.gov/crt/frequently-
asked-questions-faqs#lpr (last updated Jan. 31, 2017). 
 119. OSC is an agency within the U.S. Department of Justice. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(c). 
 120. DEP’T JUSTICE, supra note 118. 
121. Id.
 122. DEP’T JUSTICE, Telephone Interventions, https://www.justice.gov/crt/osc-telephone-
interventions-0 (last updated Feb. 23, 2017) (referring to telephone intervention on Oct. 6, 2011). 
123. Id. (referring to telephone intervention on Sept. 10, 2010); Id. (referring to telephone intervention 
on January 7, 2009); Id. (referring to telephone intervention on Jan. 29, 2009). 
124. Id. (referring to telephone intervention on Nov. 24, 2008). 
125. See Abrego & Lakhani, supra note 94, at 276–79, 287. 
 126. Hallett, supra note 93, at 630. 
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was.127 She faced similar challenges when she found a job and her TPS came 
close to expiring: 
They had told me that I need to bring it in before I start work again. My 
supervisor even told me that if it expired, I would not be able to work . . . 
I was being pressured. Not too hard, but to make sure that I have it . . . 
you have to be on top of your thing.128
For workers transitioning into TPS from a previous unauthorized status, 
similar complications emerged. Mackenzy explained, “It was a headache for 
me at work to bring my real working papers because they didn’t know under 
what status I was working.”129
Karl also feared retaliation and unemployment, and expressed hesitance 
about complaining about workplace issues to an employer. When asked about 
complaints, Karl’s response was “I don’t talk to my co-workers. I have a 
philosophy about jobs. We [go] there to work. We finish working . . . You go 
home.”130 Karl asserted that you never should talk about problems at work 
because, if you do, “they are going to fire you.”131
V. LAW-INDUCED INHIBITORS: SOME CAVEATS
This article has considered how three broad legal regimes shape the lives 
of three groups of workers with uncertain futures under U.S. immigration 
law: unauthorized immigrants, H-2 guest workers, and immigrants who have 
been granted Temporary Protected Status. It has demonstrated that the law 
creates conditions of precarity for each group of workers, however in 
different ways and through different institutional mechanisms.  
We do not intend to assert that legal regimes can paint the full picture 
of precarity for non-citizen workers. Even though we have centered our 
analysis on how legal regimes block claimsmaking, we acknowledge that the 
law can sometimes empower these workers to make claims under the right 
conditions.132 Moreover, with our laser focus on the legal institutional 
context, we do not mean to deny the myriad other factors that influence 
employees’ rights mobilization, such as gender, race, religion, class, and 
 127.  Interview by Jessica Santos with Heloise Doe, Temp. Protected Status Holder, in New York, 
New York (July 21, 2016). See also id. (“And I was looking for job, but it was tough. Because certain 
places, I don’t think they know what was the TPS at the moment, or I don’t know because it’s temporary 
it probably catches them. . . .”). 
 128. Interview by Jessica Santos with Heloise Doe, Temp. Protected Status Holder, in New York, 
New York (July 21, 2016).  
 129. Interview by Kennys Lawson with Mackenzy Doe, Temp. Protected Status Holder, in New York, 
New York (July 14, 2016). 
 130. Interview by Kennys Lawson with Karl Doe, Temp. Protected Status Holder, in New York, New 
York (Aug. 8, 2016). 
131. Id.
 132. GLEESON, supra note 6, at 76–78.  
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geography.133 As Rathod reminds us, there is a “rich interplay” between an 
employee’s immigration status and their other characteristics, as well as 
broader structural dynamics.134
In a similar vein, low-wage workers “in increasingly Latino-ized 
occupations” may have internalized a devaluation of their work that inhibits 
claimsmaking, regardless of their current immigration status.135 Moreover, 
Herrera’s recent work with nonindigenous and indigenous Latino day 
laborers in Oakland, California helpfully demonstrates variation even within 
Oakland’s Latino day laborer community.136 In doing so, he exposes that 
“illegality” is highly “racialized.”137
These complexities notwithstanding, we maintain that the particulars of 
the legal institutional environment facing different categories of immigrant 
workers demands scrutiny. A worker’s position vis-à-vis immigration law 
and broader legal institutional contexts—while certainly racialized—is 
undoubtedly a relevant factor in immigrant workers’ lives and decision-
making processes.138 Immigration status, similar to race, class and gender, 
operates as a “master status” in the workplace.139 It is a designation provided 
by law,140 but it also shapes how an individual interacts with the law. As 
Armenta finds in her ethnography of policing, “laws converge to 
systematically criminalize and punish Latinos in the United States.”141
Immigration law, along with other aspects of law that touch upon an 
individual’s experience (such as adminigration processes, crimmigration and 
immployment), can help set the broad dimensions of precarity for immigrant 
workers. Indeed, some scholars of stratification and inequality have begun to 
characterize legal control as “a premier stratifying institution.”142 A non-
citizen employee’s position vis-à-vis the law is even more salient in the 
 133. Chacón, supra note 15, at 731, 753 (referring to these as “overlapping forms of liminality” and 
noting that “intersectional vulnerabilities compound the destabilizing effects of each form of liminality”). 
 134. Jayesh M. Rathod, Beyond the “Chilling Effect”: Immigrant Worker Behavior and the 
Regulation of Occupational Safety & Health, 14 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 267, 293 (2010); Jayesh M. 
Rathod, Danger and Dignity: Immigrant Day Laborers and Occupational Risk, 46 SETON HALL L. REV.
813 (2016). 
135. See Leticia M. Saucedo, The Browning of the American Workplace: Protecting Workers in 
Increasingly Latino-ized Occupations, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 303 (2004). See also Lisa Catanzarite, 
Dynamics of Segregation and Earnings in Brown-Collar Occupations, 29 WORK AND OCCUPATIONS 300, 
306 (2002). 
 136. Juan Herrera, Racialized Illegality: The Regulation of Informal Labor and Space, 14 LATINO 
STUD. 320, 325–38 (2016). 
137. Id. at 323–25. 
138. See generally Menjívar & Abrego, supra note 112 (discussing ways that immigration status 
shapes experience). 
 139. Shannon Gleeson & Roberto Gonzales, When Do Papers Matter? An Institutional Analysis of 
Undocumented Life in the United States, 50 INT’L MIGRATION 1, 3 (2012). 
 140. Gleeson, supra note 53, at 563. 
 141. Amada Armenta, Racializing Crimmigration Structural Racism, Colorblindness, and the 
Institutional Production of Immigrant Criminality, 3 SOC. RACE & ETHNICITY 82, 82, 92–3 (2016). 
 142. Stuart, Armenta & Osborne, supra note 51, at 241. 
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current uncertain and hostile political context surrounding immigration law 
and policy.143 Conditions for non-citizen workers have undoubtedly 
worsened under President Trump’s administration.144
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In sum, this article draws from a number of different sources to develop 
a theory of law-induced inhibitors to claimsmaking for temporary immigrant 
workers in the United States, including: a survey of the legal landscape and 
law review literature; studies (mostly ethnographic) of the nature of precarity 
for TPS workers and other temporary immigrants; socio-legal studies of legal 
mobilization generally, and particularly with respect to unauthorized workers 
and low-wage guest workers; and preliminary data from the authors’ pilot 
study of workers in New York City who have TPS. 
Our intent was to highlight that the form and mechanism of precarity 
differs for three groups of non-citizen workers (unauthorized, H-2 guest 
workers, temporary immigrant workers). Each of these categories of worker 
interfaces distinctly with the institutional spaces of crimmigration,
immployment and adminigration processes. In doing so, we do not argue that 
one of the three groups we examine is necessarily more precarious than the 
other. We also do not contend that these institutional spaces can be 
considered in isolation, but rather that they intersect with each other in 
different ways depending on a non-citizen individual’s immigration law 
category. Indeed, the case of TPS shows how the adminigration regime 
interacts with both crimmigration and immployment dynamics. 
This article’s observations contribute to three distinct literatures. First, 
similar to Goldring,145 Anderson,146 Menjívar and others, our theoretical 
framework speaks to strains of the migration scholarship that are too often 
focused on the binary of un/authorized status. It builds on Goldring’s notion 
of “conditionality” by highlighting how states, even outside of the guest 
worker/labor migration policy arena, can shape temporary migrant workers’ 
precarity in unique ways.147 It builds on Menjívar’s observation that one’s 
position vis-a-vis immigration law is “paramount” to the lives and work of 
 143. GLEESON, supra note 6, at 133–36. 
 144. Lisa Desjardins, What is Donald Trump’s 10-Point Immigration Plan?, PUB. BROAD. SERV.
(Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/donald-trumps-10-point-immigration-plan. 
145. See Goldring, Berinstein & Bernhard, supra note 14. 
 146. Anderson, supra not 39. 
 147. Luin Goldring, Resituating Temporariness as the Precarity and Conditionality of Non-
citizenship in LIBERATING TEMPORARINESS; MIGRATION, WORK AND CITIZENSHIP IN AN AGE OF 
INSECURITY IN CANADA (VOSKO, PRESTON & LATHAM EDS.) (2014). 
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temporary immigrants by unraveling how TPS may interact with broader 
legal regimes in ways that inhibit employee claimsmaking.148
Second, the article engages theories of claimsmaking, which have well-
established the challenges facing unauthorized workers and H-2 guest 
workers in coming forward, but have heretofore poorly theorized the 
limitations that authorized, but temporary, non-guest workers face. And 
lastly, the article contributes an institutional analysis of social stratification 
through the law. It concentrates especially on three intersecting contexts of 
inequality: the criminalization of immigration enforcement, the 
administrative state, and immigration regulation in the employment sphere. 
In the current period of increased policing, along with a backing away from 
humanitarian relief (most notably with regards to refugees, but also other 
humanitarian categories such as TPS), the negative effects of these legal 
institutional dynamics are likely to intensify.
We advocate for future research that considers how the inhibitors 
identified here interact with the actual decision-making processes of workers. 
Rather than simply complicate classical dispute pyramid models of naming, 
blaming, and claiming, we argue that it is crucial to dissect the actual 
decision-making process for workers whose choices drive the claims-driven 
bottom-up system of workplace law enforcement in the United States. Some 
of these dynamics are likely to parallel challenges in other arenas of rights 
enforcement, such as crime reporting. 
We offer a few additional suggestions for ground-up studies of workers’ 
decision-making moving forward. First, future studies should not assume that 
unauthorized workers will always be the least likely to make claims against 
their employers, as compared to TPS workers and H-2 workers. In our 
analysis, we did highlight some formidable inhibitors for unauthorized 
employees’ claimsmaking, such as fear of the crimmigration regime’s 
deportation machinery. It is plausible, however, that unauthorized workers 
may be more likely than TPS and H-2 workers to make claims against their 
employers in some circumstances. The uncertainty and surveillance 
mechanisms of TPS and the subordinated status of H-2 workers vis-à-vis 
their employers pose challenges to claimsmaking that unauthorized workers 
do not face and that may limit opportunities to voice dissent. Unauthorized 
individuals, who are not registered with the government, and are in effect 
“free agents” in the labor market, do not experience these same dynamics.  
Indeed, a core finding of psychological studies on decision-making, 
especially the loss aversion heuristic, suggests that researchers should be 
careful about making the assumption that unauthorized workers suffer the 
 148. Menjívar, supra note 16, at 1003. 
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greatest inhibitors to workplace law claimsmaking.149 Simply put, this 
perspective conveys that individuals are more risk averse in their decision-
making when they perceive that they will potentially lose something by 
taking the risk, than when they perceive that they could gain something.150
As Weyland characterized it when applying this theory to explain risky 
decisions by Latin America political leaders in the 1980s and 1990s, “[c]rises 
trigger bold actions, while better times induce risk aversion.”151
If TPS workers view claimsmaking as associated with a potential loss 
of their Temporary Protected Status, they may have a unique claiming 
inhibitor that unauthorized workers (who do not have even temporary 
immigration authorization) do not confront.152 This may be the case even if 
TPS workers have knowledge of their rights and even if the disincentives to 
claimsmaking are reduced through additional legally mandated remedies and 
protections against retaliation. The status quo is a key reference point for 
decision-makers and they will “defend it more fiercely against threats of 
losses.”153 Relatedly, this theory would predict that political upheaval and the 
threat of an imminent end to the TPS program could lead to more risk taking, 
such as engaging in a workplace law complaint.  
Second, the cross-border lives of immigrants in general should be 
considered as this dynamic no doubt shapes their decision-making about 
whether to engage in claimsmaking against their employers. Indeed, many of 
the interviewees in our pilot study often referred to their connections to their 
birth country. Sociologists have long examined the impact of a “dual frame 
of reference” on immigrant behavior building on classic work by Michael 
Piore.154 Recent work by Julia Gelatt weighs the competing ties and norms 
that immigrants rely on (either home-country or destination-country) when 
 149. Kahneman and Tversky first presented the loss aversion heuristic, which is a subset of their 
“prospect theory.” Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under 
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263–65 (1979). 
150. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative 
Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK UNCERTAINTY 297, 297–99 (1992); Amos Tversky & Daniel 
Kahneman, The Psychology of Preferences, 246 SCI. AM., Jan. 160, 160 (1982); Tversky & Kahneman, 
supra note 149, at 263–65. 
 151. Kurt Weyland, The Political Fate of Market Reform in Latin America, Africa, and Eastern 
Europe, 42 INT’L STUD. Q. 645, 648 (1998). 
 152. Kahneman and Tversky’s work, and the experiments and field studies that followed, challenges 
some rational choice assumptions that individuals (when properly informed) make decisions about what 
is in their self-interest after they comprehensively calculate all of the relevant incentives and disincentives. 
Rational choice theories “make unrealistic assumptions about human capacities for processing 
information.” KURT WEYLAND, THE POLITICS OF MARKET REFORM IN FRAGILE DEMOCRACIES:
ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, PERU, AND VENEZUELA 38 (2002). In contrast to these rational choice assumptions, 
these scholars posited that people use “cognitive shortcuts,” what they and others call “heuristics,” to 
make decisions about the likely outcomes of their behavior. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lecture, Moral 
Heuristics and Moral Framing, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1556, 1558 (2004) (characterizing heuristics as playing 
a “pervasive role” in legal judgments). 
 153. WEYLAND, supra note 152, at 40. 
 154. MICHAEL J. PIORE, BIRDS OF PASSAGE: MIGRANT LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES (1979). 
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evaluating their social condition.155 Gelatt confirms that in many cases 
immigrant workers simultaneously endure low-status jobs for the sake of 
their children and other social obligations, but are not necessarily satisfied or 
content in evaluating their condition. This means that the cross-border lives 
of immigrants—and their related family concerns—no doubt shape their 
decision-making and sense of well-being. 
Moving forward, it is our hope that this article’s theoretical framework 
can set the stage for an empirical research agenda that does the following. 
We must seek out measures of immigration status that not only go beyond 
the authorized/unauthorized divide and beyond the guest worker context, but 
also which interrogate the multifaceted forms of temporariness as sources of 
precarity. Quantitative survey data that can capture these distinct immigration 
law categories will continue to be important, insofar as it is collected in an 
ethical and reliable way that preserves confidentiality. Nonetheless, 
qualitative interviews with individuals who are in temporary non-guest 
worker immigration categories like TPS are crucial, even if they do not form 
a majority or even a large section of the non-citizen population. Finally, we 
advocate for a cross-disciplinary approach which examines both social and 
structural factors (e.g., at the level of the government and the market) that 
shape workplace precarity and the migrant decision-making process.  
 155. Julia Felatt, Looking Down or Looking Up: Status and Subjective Well-Being Among Asian and 
Latino Immigrants in the United States, 47 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 39 (2013). 
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